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DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
– CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN TIMES
OF ECONOMIC CRISIS
Europe is the birthplace of modern industry. The Industrial Revolution of the late
18th century secured this continent’s position as the prime global centre of economic,
political and military power for the next two hundred years. In the second half of the
20th century and in first decades of the next one, Europe’s place in the world balance
of economic power gradually declined. Competition from new industrial power-
houses of North America and Asia, together with globalisation-driven offshoring and
deindustrialisation proved to be formidable challenges for the continent’s manufacturing
sector. Although, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, this new sector’s activity
was civilian in nature, the military applications of new technologies were quickly appre-
ciated. The defence (or arms) industry quickly developed into one of the leading manu-
facturing sectors in terms of scale, profits and technological innovation. It paved the way
for the massive total warfare as witnessed in the first half of the 20th century. In this field
Europe was both a precursor and leader for about 200 years. Forty years of cold war
struggle allowed for themaintenance of extensivemilitary-industrial potential inWestern
as well as Eastern Europe. Even after the collapse of the bipolar international order
EU-based companies remained among the top players in the global arms market.
The current period of financial and economic crisis (initiated by the collapse of
Lehman brothers at 15th September 2008) could prove to be a turning point for the fu-
ture of European defence industry. The fiscal retrenchment in most EU states and turbu-
lence in the global markets confront this sector with some hard questions. The purpose
of this article is to analyse the current situation faced by the European defence sector and
sketch possible scenarios of its future developments. For this purpose, the model of
SWOT analysis has been applied. It allowed to take into consideration both internal
(strengths and weaknesses) as well as external (threats and opportunities) factors influ-
encing the current state of the industry. In field of armsmanufacturing political, economic
andmilitary issues intersect. That is why the future of defence sector in the EU carries im-
portant implications for the community’s security, as well as economic development.
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY – BRIEF OVERVIEW
When considering the future prospects for the European defence sector, it is useful
to first quickly review its size, market position and main players. Useful data can be
found in publications of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
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(ASD). This organization has member association in 20 states (17 EU member states,
Norway, Switzerland and Turkey).1 It compiles some basic statistics useful for the eval-
uation of the European defence industry’s size and performance. However, two caveats
are in place. First, the data come only from the 20 states whose companies participate in
the works of the association. Second, the organization deals not only with the defence
sector, but also with the broader aerospace industry which operates in both civilian and
military markets. According to ASD data, in year 2010 the turnover of the aerospace
and defence industry was _0length162.9bn (with a 58:42% share in favor of business’s civil
side). Companies from these sectors directly employed 704,200 people (500,000 of
them in the aerospace sector). Data for Research&Development (R&D) expenditure
cover only the aerospace sector. This effort amounted to _0length13bn. Industry’s operating
profit margin was 6,8%.2 Those data show that the European defence industry is gener-
ally in good commercial condition. It is also noteworthy that the aerospace sector seems
to be the main driver for growth and development.
European producer’s position on the global defence market is reflected in the arms
transfers data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
In the 2001–2011 period, six out of ten top global exporters were EU member states.
They were: Germany (position no. 3), France (no. 4), UK (no. 5), Netherlands (no. 7),
Italy (no. 9), and Sweden (no. 10). During that period, these six states exported arms
and military equipment worth ca. $70bl.3 It is also noteworthy that the Top 100 defence
companies list published by the “Defense News” magazine, is dominated by US and
EU companies. Among ten biggest defence companies in year 2010 seven were Ameri-
can and the remaining three were West European: BAE Systems (UK,4 position no. 2),
EADS (Netherlands, no. 7) and Finmeccanica (Italy, no. 8).5
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
In order to properly understand and evaluate the significance of the defence sector
for the EU and its member states, it is important to first analyse functions which are per-
formed by this industry in general (around the world). In author’s opinion, there are
four main functional areas which explain the industry’s utility for the state, economy
and society:
 Military – naturally, the most basic task of the defence industry is to support the
state’s defence posture in peacetime and military effort in wartime. Modern armed
96 Rafa³ WIŒNIEWSKI
1 ASD Facts & Figures – 2010, http://www.asdeurope.org/site/fileadmin/images/publica-
tions_thumbs/FF2010.pdf (8.06.2012), p. 2.
2 Ibidem, p. 4.
3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers Database, http://arm-
strade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php (8.06.2012).
4 It is important to remember, that although BAE Systems is a UK registered company, large part
of its turnover comes from the US subsidiary. BAE Systems Inc., http://www.baesystems.com/
our-company-rus/bae-systems-inc-rus (8.06.2012).
5 Defense News Top 100 for 2010, http://special.defensenews.com/top-100/charts/rank_
2010.php?c=FEA&s=T1C (8.06.2012).
forces require vast quantities of sophisticated weapon systems and other military
equipment. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (or, more precisely, the
widespread application of its achievements for military purposes) warfare has be-
come ever more technology-intensive. During the great armed conflicts of the 20th
century technology’s role as one of the main factors shaping the outcome of military
struggle was clearly established. Developments of the late 20th and early 21st century
(the drive towards another Revolution in Military Affairs and Network-Cen-
tred-Warfare) point to ever greater role of technology for the successful conduct of
military operations.6 Defence industry’s military function is derived from three basic
tasks. First, at the most basic level, this sector is supposed to supply the military with
arms and military equipment at the qualitative and quantitative level deemed neces-
sary for the successful execution of military operations. Second, defence industry
provides the technological base for the maintenance and development of military po-
tential. Large part of R&D work conducted for military purposes is done by the in-
dustry. Finally, what is sometimes overlooked, defence contractors play crucial role
in maintenance of the weapon systems during their entire life-cycle. They provide
training, technical services, repairs, updates and many other support functions. In re-
cent decades growing trend towards cost reduction has led to outsourcing of some
crucial military capabilities (like, for example, training or aerial refuelling) to the pri-
vate sector.7
 Political – much has been said and written about the military-industrial complex and
its political influence.8 For the purpose of this paper those deliberations had been put
aside. Instead, the utility of the defence industry for state’s foreign and security pol-
icy will be analysed. From the very beginning the arms trade was intertwined with in-
ternational politics. Leading powers were able to influence their allies and shape the
dynamic of armed conflicts through facilitation or denial of arms transfers. As states
seek to obtain modern weaponry, which they view as essential for their military secu-
rity, those who posses such technologies can gain significant political influence.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that circumstances in the global defence
market have changed significantly during the last several decades. In the past, arms
market was practically a “seller’s market”. Not many states possessed the capability
to manufacture sophisticated weapons. Those who did utilized it primarily for the
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domestic purposes. Leading producers could pick and choose their buyers. Right
now, in the post-cold war world, leading defence contractors face declining domestic
markets and rising international competition. That is why currently we can talk about
the “buyer’s market” in defence goods. The biggest customers (like for example In-
dia) can now pick and choose among offers from leading global suppliers. Defence
industry’s political function is also derived from the “security of supply” it provides.
When weapons and military equipment are imported, the supplier exercises a level of
control over the operational capability of buyer’s military. Finally, the capability for
development and production of sophisticated weapon systems grants the state a con-
siderable international prestige.
 Economic – as shown by the ASD data cited above, defence industry is a profitable
commercial enterprise. In the course of the 20th century expansion of military ma-
teriel production was used as a stimulus for the national economy (for example, the
intensive build-up during the World War II provided much needed expansion for the
US economy). Defence sector’s advantage in comparison with other fields of manu-
facturing is its lesser dependence on business cycles. Although the arms market is not
completely immune from influences of recession or crisis (as visible in recent years),
their effects are less acute. In general, it can be stated that demand for military equip-
ment is less flexible than in the case of other commercial goods. What is important,
defence sector can definitely be counted as one of the so called “high-tech indus-
tries”. It has long been one of the prime innovators and many technologies developed
for the benefit of the military have “spilled-over” to the civilian world.
 Welfare – considering the socio-economic developments of the last two decades in
Europe, it can be argued that the defence industry has an important welfare role to ful-
fil. Globalisation has lead to far-reaching changes in the European industrial land-
scape. The traditional heavy industry (like for example steel making or shipbuilding)
shifted itsmainmanufacturing operations into lower-cost developing economies (chief
among them China). As a consequence, the continent faced so called “industrial de-
cline”. The consequences of this process are not only purely economic. The social and
welfare impact has also been considerable. The loss of traditional manufacturing jobs
unsettled the established socio-economic system. Traditional industrial areas faced ris-
ing unemployment and other socioeconomic ills associated with it. In this context, it can
be argued that the defence industry is one of the last heavy industry sectors remaining
in Europe. Moreover, its relocation is highly improbable due to its sensitive military
and political functions described above. Thus, defence production creates opportuni-
ties for large scale employment for the traditional industrial workforce.
INTERNAL STRENGTHS
The EU-based defence industry has several important internal strengths, which fos-
ter its ability to effectively compete in both domestic and international markets. Chief
among them are: strong market position, rich and diverse range of products, expertise in
some of the most promising sectors of the market, experience in multinational indus-
trial cooperation and synergy with the civilian operations.
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European defence companies are principal suppliers dominating the EU markets for
arms and military equipment. According to data provided by the ASD (for year 2010),
its member companies provided 3/4 of the total defence investment undertaken by
20 states covered.9 This amounted to ca. _0length45bn from a total sum of abut _0length60bn invested.
In the same year, exports by ASD-affiliated military aerospace/defence companies
amounted to _0length23bn in intra-EU transfers and additional _0length25bn of sales to non-EU cus-
tomers (20% of it to the USA).10 In “A Strategy for a stronger and more competitive
European defence industry” prepared by the European Commission in year 2007 infor-
mation can be found, that European defence industry accounts for 30% of world pro-
duction.11 In the aforementioned list of top 100 defence companies compiled by the
“Defence News” magazine, entities from the EU comprise almost a quarter of the entire
pool (24 companies).12
Market attractiveness of European industry’s offer is derived from (among other
factors) its diversity and flexibility. Currently, EU-based suppliers are able to manufac-
ture most of the internationally tradable categories of arms and military equipment.
What is important, they can offer products from different segments suited for needs and
financial abilities of different customers. Europe can develop and produce a wide range
of military systems. On one side of the spectrum there are sophisticated weapon sys-
tems, like for example modern multirole combat aircraft (three types are being manu-
factured in the EU- Dasault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab JAS-39 Gripen),
heavy Armoured Combat Vehicles (for example Main Battle Tanks – Leopard 2,
Leclerc, Challenger 2, Ariette, or Puma Infantry Combat Vehicle) or nuclear subma-
rines (build in France and UK, naturally, for domestic use only) and fleet carriers (again
France and UK posses these capabilities). At the lower end of operational capabilities
(and cost) there are, for example, light transport aircraft (like those offered by EADS
CASA or Alenia), light armoured vehicles (wide range of producers) or Offshore Patrol
Vessels/smaller surface combatants (the Gowind family, offered by the French DCNS,
can provide a useful example13). This flexibility can offer advantages in competition,
especially with the US companies. As they develop their products mainly for their own
armed forces, they are naturally suited for its structure, tasks and doctrine. While the
USAis the sole superpower, its defence contractors often provide systems with capabil-
ities (and most importantly costs) far exceeding the needs and abilities of great majority
of other states.
European defence sector includes champions of some important market segments
which show good prospects for future growth. One of the most prestigious and profit-
able segments of the arms market concerns the multirole combat aircraft. As mentioned
earlier, currently three EU-based companies produce such machines: French Dassault
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Aviation (Rafale), Eurofighter Gmbh (a 4-nation consortium –Germany/Italy/Spain/UK,
Eurofighter Typhoon) and Swedish Saab (JAS-39 Gripen). In recent years, transport
and tanker aircraft received growing attention from buyers around the globe. Airbus
Military, the defence arm of leading aircraft manufacturer, is well positioned to satisfy
this demand with a range of products (starting with light CASA CN-235 and C-295 air-
craft, newly developed A400M and Multi Role Transport Tanker series adopted from
airliners). Recent armed conflicts (primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq) reaffirmed great
usefulness of helicopters for modern military operations. European companies Agusta
Westland and Eurocopter are among the leading global suppliers of such aircraft. The
MBDA group is one of the main global players in the field of missile technology. It can
offer almost all categories of air, land, surface and subsurface launched missiles and
more widely precision guided munitions. Recently, it entered the elite market for mis-
sile defence systems.14
In the context of RMA and NCW concepts development it is hardly surprising that
defence electronics generate substantial profits. European companies with significant
expertise in this regard are (among others) Thales and Selex Sistemi Integrati (currently
part of Finmeccanica). Recent combat experience has driven demand for armoured ve-
hicles of different types. Such European companies like: Krauss-Maffei Wegman,
Rheinmetall Defence, Iveco Defence Vehicles, Patria, Nexter, BAE Land&Armaments
have earned a high reputation in this segment of the market. The small arms market is
often overlooked as the per-item price for such weapons is relatively low. However, it
must be remembered that every military/paramilitary/police force needs such arms in
large quantities. There are many respected small arms producers in Europe, but two
firms stand out. German Heckler&Koch and Belgian FN Herstall have a long history of
significant presence in the global market. They offer a wide range of small arms and
both have secured many prestigious contracts (among them for the US military, espe-
cially for the US Special Operations Command). Finally, in the naval sector such large
contractors like the French DCNS or German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems have
a very strong position as suppliers of both surface and subsurface combatants. In fact
the international market for conventionally powered submarines is practically domi-
nated by EU and Russian companies.
Trends in the global defence market point to a growing demand for rather novel
competency which is expertise in management and successful completion of multina-
tional co-development programmes. In the past, military equipment was typically de-
veloped in form of national programmes or procured from foreign contactors as
a finished product. In the post-cold war period, joint development through international
industrial programmes proliferated. There are two main factors driving this process.
First, modern weapon systems became so technologically complicated and costly that
even the richest states face significant difficulties in successfully developing them on
their own. Even the USA pursues multinational programmes (chief among them the
Joint Strike Fighter). West European states, whose defence expenditure and technologi-
cal-industrial base had been historically smaller than American, arrived at those con-
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clusions much earlier. Second factor driving this “multilateralisation” of weapon
system’s development are growing demands of export customers. Leading importers
(like for example India or the Gulf region states) are no longer satisfied with purchases
of complete defence products. They strive to develop their own industry in order to
achieve a degree of self-sufficiency. Those states are also eager to secure promotion for
their industries in the global division of labour into high-technology echelon. That is
why they demand co-development as part of their procurement strategies. Mayor
global players, facing difficult and highly-competitive market are prepared to satisfy
those demands.
As already mentioned, European companies have extensive experience in multina-
tional endeavours. In the span of last 50 years, West European states have pursued nu-
merous co-development and co-production programmes. Currently there are several
such endeavours under way across the continent, like for example: Eurofighter, NH90
helicopter, A400M transport aircraft, FSAF and PAAMS air defence systems, Tiger at-
tack helicopter or Boxer armoured vehicle.15 Although those programmes are not free
of challenges, stemming primarily from differences in national requirements and ar-
guments about the work share among participants, it can be argued that European
defence suppliers have the greatest expertise in this field from all global market partici-
pants. Several examples of how those skills were put to good use in order to secure ex-
port contracts can be named. In order to secure order for its submarines from Brazil,
French DCNS provided a package which included not only the ships themselves, but
also assistance in development of shipyard, naval base and nuclear propulsion
programme.16 Interesting case is the joint offer of MBDA and Polish Bumar group of the
“Shield of Poland” system of systems for air defence. The European partner agreed to
participate in development and further exports of system combining its missiles with
Polish electronics, command and control systems and various other sub-systems.17
Another important factor working to the strength of the European defence sector is
its growing integration and synergy with the civilian sector. As already mentioned,
ASD statistics show that in year 2010 civil business activity provided 58% of the
aerospace and defence industry’s turnover.18 The same source recognizes the civil
aeronautics as the most important sector of the ASD industry in terms of turnover. In
the aeronautics field itself, the civilian side of business activity clearly dominates its
military counterpart in financial terms (constituting 60% of European aeronautics in-
dustry’s turnover).19 Close links between civilian and military production are nothing
new. Many technologies used for arms and military equipment development and pro-
duction are dual-use in nature. That is way many companies contribute to the wider
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defence industrial and technology base without identifying themselves with the arms
sector.20
In the post-cold war market environment greater integration of civil and defence
sectors is a growing trend. It stems primarily form a fact that, due to profound changes
in many state’s defence postures and worsening budgetary outlook, it is ever more diffi-
cult for the companies to make desired profits (or even sustain themselves) from de-
fence procurement alone. Additionally, the direction of technology transfer between
the sectors has partially changed. Traditionally, military R&D resulted in spin-offs to
the civilian industry. Right now, it is ever more frequent for defence contractors to use
the so called Commercial off-the-shelf technologies (COTS).21 In this way, enterprises
can benefit from presence in both civilian and military market. Dual revenue streams
contribute to company’s financial stability while benefits can be drawn from the syn-
ergy of R&D, as well as production, across the civil and military domain. Airbus offers
a great example. The company has successfully used its proven airliners as a base for
military applications. When it comes to civil-defence integration European industry
fares quite good. Many top defence companies in Europe have a record of significant
civilian sales, contrary to most of the biggest US defence contractors.22 For example
around the middle of the past decade, US aerospace companies had a median share of
the defence sales to the tune of 50%, while their European counterparts’ median was
38%.23
INTERNAL WEAKNESSES
The single most important weakness of the European defence industry is its frag-
mentation. In can be argued that there are simply too many small companies, which are
unable to create the sort of “economies of scale” effects currently sought after in the
global market. It is difficult to properly asses the exact number of defence companies,
mainly because of difficulties in properly defining which entities are in the “defence
business” and which are only supporting it.24 The ASD puts the number of leading play-
ers at around 20, followed by ca. 100 large and medium companies (mainly suppliers)
and vast number of specialised Small and Medium Enterprises (SME).25 As has already
been outlined in preceding paragraphs, after the year 1989 defence markets in the west-
ern world evolved in direction of much more competitive environment. In the USA the
response from both industry and government was a drive towards concentration. In ef-
fect, during the 1990s American market witnessed creation of several big contractors
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which dominated domestic procurement and became global champions.26 At the same
time in Europe, despite considerable movement towards increased mergers and acqui-
sitions, the industrial landscape didn’t change that much. In effect, European defence
companies tend to be significantly smaller than their American competitors. When
comparing top US and European aerospace companies one report stated that average
American entity was about 22 times larger than its European counterpart.27 In the land
sector the average American company was 1.5 times bigger than the European one,28
and in the naval sector this ratio climbs to 3.4.29
Fragmentation weakens the European defence sector in several ways. As already
mentioned, it denies the effects of scale and synergy (both in terms of orders and avail-
able resources). What is even more problematic, it creates large-scale redundancies and
stirs intra-European competition. Currently there are simply too many manufacturers
offering similar products. For example, EU-based producers offer 3 types of multirole
combat aircraft and 4 models of Main Battle Tanks. There are also 16 producers of Ar-
moured Fighting Vehicles, 3 of 155 mm howitzers30 and two industrial centres capable
of producing nuclear-powered submarines. The shrinking European defence market is
simply unable to sustain such a variety of platforms. In external markets European bid-
ders must fiercely compete not only with formidable US, Russian (and many other)
competitors, but also among themselves. Main obstacle to rationalization is political.
Contrary to America, where one national market and regulatory framework exists, EU
is practically divided into 27 separate defence markets and procurement processes. Of-
ten, governments strive to protect their national defence industries in the interest of sov-
ereignty. They are also interested in provision of all defence industry’s functions (as
described earlier in this paper) on a national level.
EXTERNAL THREATS
At the moment, two significant threats can be identified in European defence indus-
try’s external environment. They concern both its domestic markets in Europe, as well
as the global business environment in this sector. First, EU member states, which tradi-
tionally spent much less on defence than their American ally, are under intensive fiscal
pressure to scale-down their government expenditure. Trend towards austerity, caused
by the global financial crisis and especially the situation in the euro zone, has lead to
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significant cuts in defence budgets across the continent. According to data compiled by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies for the 2008–2010 period, real-terms re-
ductions in defence spending occurred in 16 out of the 23 European NATO members.
In over 40% of those states expenditure decline amounted to more than 10%. In effect,
total NATO Europe defence spending fell by 5.4% during the aforementioned period.31
In year 2011 Europe was overtaken by Asia and Australasia in terms of global defence
expenditure’s share by region (with former taking the 18.3% to the second’s 18.5%).32
Data compiled by the European Defence Agency show that in year 2010 total defence
expenditure of the Agency’s member states remained at the same level as in year 2009.
However, as a percentage of overall government expenditure they declined to the tune
of 3.3%.33 What is even more important from the industry’s perspective, funding for in-
vestment in 2010 (equipment procurement as well as R&D) was 0.1% lower than in the
previous year.34 It may not seem especially severe, but it must be remembered that
those are aggregate data for 26 states which participate in the EDA’s work.
Cuts in particular states had been quite deep. For example, three leading EU states in
field of both defence expenditure and military capability: France, Germany and UK
have planned (and partially executed) significant cuts to both spending and force struc-
tures. France intends to cut its planned defence expenditure in the 2011–2013 period by
_0length3.5bn. Germany aims to cut _0length8.3bn from its defence budget up to year 2015. At the
same time, far-reaching reductions in the number of MBTs, artillery pieces and subma-
rines are envisioned. The Strategic Defence and Security Review, published by the UK
government in October 2010, aims to institute severe cuts in spending, manpower and
operational capabilities (in terms of in service equipment). For example, British Army
(the land forces) will shed ca. 20,000 personnel by the year 2020. Entire classes of
weapon systems have been reduced, most visibly the aircraft carriers and combat naval
aviation (specifically the Harrier aircraft). Naval air capability will be restored only in
the second half of this decade when new carriers will enter service.35 Those develop-
ments have very serious implications for the European defence-industrial base. Since
the end of the cold war the domestic European markets had been shrinking, impinging
on defence companies’ market position. After the last wave of cuts (which, considering
the economic situation in Europe, must not necessarily be the last one) serious ques-
tions arise whether servicing the shrinking European armed forces’ structures will be
enough to ensure the further development of the defence-industrial base (or perhaps
even to maintain its current position).
Considering the trends described above it seems that the future of Europe’s defence
sector will be ever more dependent on export sales to non-EU states. But those markets
also became more demanding. Despite unfavourable global economic outlook dynamic
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sources of demand for defence materiel remain (especially in Africa, Asia and the Mid-
dle East).36 However, global defence companies must operate in much more competi-
tive field than two decades ago. Recently, many new players entered the market, often
pursuing aggressive expansion strategies. There were 23 companies from outside North
America and Western (NATO and EU) Europe in the “Top 100 efence companies”
ranking of the “Defense News” magazine for year 2010. They represent such states as
Russia, Japan, Israel, South Korea, India or Turkey.37 It points to a trend in which de-
fence contractors from the so called “emerging economies” (like for example Brazil,
South Korea or Turkey) are not only catering for the greater share of their own armed
forces’ needs, but are also looking for export opportunities. They have scored some
successes. To name just a few: Brazilian Embraer has a strong position in the sector of
training/light attack aircraft, as well as airframes for specialist applications,38 Turkish
Ottokar successfully promotes its armoured vehicles around the world39 and South Ko-
reans have won the competition for assistance in development of the new Turkish MBT
(Altay).40
Many states, which were traditionally importers of defence equipment, develop
their defence industries energetically. Moreover, they see expansion to foreign markets
as an important part of this strategy. For example, the Turkish government envisions its
defence industry to position itself among the ten biggest globally. In year 2016 it should
reach turnover of $8bn domestically and additional $2bn in export sales.41 Saudi Arabia
plans to invest more than $1bn in the next two years in defence manufacturing develop-
ment. The desired end state is to produce 80% of the arms for the Kingdom’s armed
forces domestically.42 Report prepared by ECORYS for the European Commission
highlights the development of defence industry in the so called BRICKs states (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Korea).43 Although the authors believe that in the fore-
seeable future companies from those states will not pose significant competitive threat
to European producers, they cannot be ignored. Russia has established a strong position
in the global defence market in the last two decades. Chinese companies have a pres-
ence mainly in the less wealthy states, but recently a Chinese company expressed inter-
est in offering its aircraft to the US Department of Defense. Naturally this offer hadn’t
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been treated seriously, but the fact itself is ominous.44 Indian manufacturers, for the
time being, have serious problems in meeting the needs of their own armed forces.
South Korean companies are gaining expertise quickly. Korea Aerospace Industries
(KAI) is engaged in intense marketing operation for its advanced T-50 Golden Eagle
trainer aircraft. There is also a joint Indonesian-South Korean program for the develop-
ment of next-generation combat aircraft.45 Considering all those developments Euro-
pean defence companies are facing a very demanding international market in which
securing new contracts will undoubtedly prove ever more difficult.
EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES
Negative trends in external environment (both inside and outside the EU) can poten-
tially be offset by some new opportunities. Despite cuts described above, EU and
NATO member states are committed to the maintenance of core military capabilities
and support for their defence industry. A growing understanding exists that significant
reforms in the fields of defence-industrial policy and military capability development
are needed to ensure this. From the very beginning, defence procurement was excluded
from the internal market regime. Article 296 of the EC Treaty (now art. 346 TFEU) in
its traditional interpretation, allowed member states to exempt purchases of signifi-
cance to serious national security interests from open European competition.46 This
prohibited the creation of single, integrated market for defence goods. The consolida-
tion of this market had been a long-standing goal for those who believed it to be crucial
for greater efficiency in defence procurement and rationalization of Europe’s defence
industry.
In the latter half of the last decade European Commission introduced a package of
reforms aimed at removing the most important obstacles to defence market liberalisa-
tion. It comprises the following acts: Interpretative Communication on Article 296
(present Article 346) from year 2006, Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC and
Intra-EU Transfer Directive 2009/43 EC. These new regulations can lay the ground-
work for the thorough transformation of the European defence sector. New interpreta-
tion of the Article 346 aims to make its application an exception, reserved for the
protection of truly “significant” national security interests. If applied, it would severely
limit member state’s ability to use “national security” clause as an excuse for protec-
tionism. The defence procurement directive provides common EU-wide legal frame-
work for conducting defence acquisition programmes, open to Union-wide competition
(naturally with several exceptions related to national security and multinational cooper-
ation). The final directive is targeted at extensive arms-exports controls which had been
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a significant obstacle to efficient pursuit of cross-border trade in defence goods. Con-
sidering the high level of trust and defence cooperation among the member states, it has
been concluded that the issuance of export licences can be simplified for the intra-EU
transfers. It should make arms trade easier and assuage fears about security of supply.
This new EU legal framework provides a very serious opportunity for creation of a sin-
gle, truly “European” defence market. It would provide stimulus for consolidation of
European defence companies. It could also provide those new large entities with mar-
ket potentially big enough to sustain them, creating situation somewhat similar to the
one prevalent in the USA.47
Another area of increased European cooperation in the defence sector is the growing
trend towards joint development and maintenance of military capabilities. Confronted
with shrinking national financial means, European states recognize the need to combine
them in order to maintain required potential. It corresponds strongly with the concept of
“smart defence”, advocated by NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmussen at
the Organization’s summit in Chicago in May 2012.48 Bastian Giegerich names five ba-
sic forms of new defence cooperation: capability sharing (joint use of national re-
sources), capability pooling (delegation of national capabilities for use in multinational
structure), role and task sharing (state specializes in some determined military capabili-
ties and depends on others to provide the rest), joint acquisition (states collaborate to
acquire and operate capabilities inside international framework) and co-development
(joint development and production of military equipment for several states).49 As de-
fence budgets across Europe shrink even further, such measures will offer some hope
for compensating the corresponding loss of capabilities. From the industry’s point of
view, such schemes may provide a way to sustain demand and create sustainable frame-
work for development of next-generation products.
Another opportunity comes from the foreign markets. As already mentioned, there
are regions (such as Africa, Asia and the Middle East) where demand for the defence
materiel is rising. Despite fierce competition, European companies still have signifi-
cant strengths form which to derive competitive advantages (both issues have been de-
scribed earlier in this paper). The aforementioned report by ECORSYS for the EC
highlights that, despite considerable development, defence industries of most BRICKs
states have quite limited market penetration. Their ability to reliably develop and de-
liver sophisticated systems is also subject of doubt.50 In contrast, EU-based firms have
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an impressive record of successful programs and a rich offer of proven products. Thus,
they are well positioned to benefit from some potentially lucrative markets.
Several examples are in order. In January 2012 French company Dassault Aviation
has won the prestigious MMRCA(Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft) competition in
India with its Rafale fighter. The pending contract to supply 126 aircraft is thought to be
worth between $10bn and $15bn.51 India can be viewed as a very promising defence
market because of its armed forces’ size, their requirements for sophisticated weapon
systems and persistent inability of its sizeable defence industry to meet military’s
needs. In recent years Russia has opened its defence procurement for foreign biders to
the level unprecedented in its post-soviet history. State, which itself is a major arms ex-
porter, seems determined to meet its armed forces’ needs with sophisticated foreign
equipment. This trend stems from drive for rapid modernization of military capabilities
(partially effect of experiences of the Five Day War of 2008) and perceived inability of
the domestic manufacturers to provide satisfying products. European companies have
already benefited from this development. The order of French Mistral class amphibious
vessels is a flagship project in this regard. Italian Iveco is also poised to cooperate with
Russian companies in production of armoured vehicles for the Russian Ministry of De-
fence.52 Even the US defence market, dominated as it is by domestic giants becomes
more open for European firms. Although the Airbus’s victory in the competition to
equip United States Air Force with new tanker aircraft was short-lived and order even-
tually went to Boeing, European contractors can play the role of key partners in some
promising programmes (like for example Ground Combat Vehicle or Marine Personnel
Carrier).53
WHAT FUTURE FOR THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY?
Trends and developments described in this paper seem to substantiate the notion
that current financial and economic crisis can mark the turning point in the evolution of
European defence sector. The evolving domestic and international markets, as well as
ever changing international strategic and military context require significant adaptation
on the industry’s side. That is why this article will end with short analysis of possible fu-
ture directions of EU-based defence sector’s evolution. Naturally, those trends do not
constitute closed, autonomous scenarios and can conceivably overlap and criss-cross
themselves. The purpose here is more to sketch out different processes which can deter-
mine the future outlook of Europe’s defence-industrial base.
First of all, it is useful to consider the implications of the “status quo” scenario.
With lack of significant reforms and continuity of present trends, it is conceivable that
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European defence-industrial base can experience stagnation and gradual decline. The
current state of the industry can prove to be unsustainable. Basically, a plethora of rela-
tively small companies dispersed around 27 national markets (practically all of them
shrinking) will encounter growing difficulties to survive commercially the current ad-
verse fiscal climate. At the same time, while the organizational structure of Europe’s
defence sector is highly fragmented, its turnover/profits structure is quite concentrated.
As noted by the ASD, in 2010 six biggest companies (EADS, BAE Systems, Fin-
meccanica, Thales, Rolls-Royce and Safran) were responsible for 3/4 of the entire aero-
space and defence sector’s turnover.54 Thus, it can be argued that in case the “status
quo” scenario is realized, this small “elite” of highly competitive companies with
strong market position will survive and prosper. Those companies will be able not only
to secure what European procurement contracts will remain in the offing, but also suc-
cessfully compete in the global market. At the same time many smaller enterprises with
less competitive advantages to draw on can face decline and even go out of the business
entirely. It is worth noting that this competitive structure of the European defence in-
dustry has quite clear geographical dimension. Majority of best performing firms co-
mes from six LoI signatory states.55 Realization of such scenario can lead to (to borrow
a popular phrase from the European integration lexicon) “Europe of different speeds”
in defence-industrial matters, with traditional industrial and export “champions” main-
taining their positions and gaps opening in other functional and geographical areas of
the industrial landscape.
Several scenarios for perseverance and development of European defence industry
are possible. As already mentioned, there is a strong constituency for “more Europe” in
this realm. EU member states can decide to purse something that can be called “triple
consolidation” – of market (creating common market for defence goods), demand
(joint acquisition and co-development) and supply (consolidation of the defence-in-
dustrial base in direction of several big entities). Naturally, consolidation must not pro-
ceed simultaneously and with same scope in all three areas. However, they are mutually
supportive and greatest effects in terms of capability maintenance and market expan-
sion can potentially be achieved with the full realization of this programme. Current
trends in the global defence sector seem to favour large companies, combining products
and expertise from different segments and thus able to offer complete, integrated com-
bat systems. Such firms are also able to muster resources necessary to pursue sophisti-
cated R&D efforts or manage complex defence programs and partnerships. Such large
enterprises require correspondingly large markets in order to sustain their business op-
erations. Thus the need to extend the European common market rules to the defence
sector. However, considering the current budgetary pressures, it is hardly conceivable
that common market with demand fragmented into 27 national armament programs
could generate desired effects. It seems that new, creative tools from the field of “smart
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defence” (like joint acquisition and co-development) will become ever more wide-
spread across Europe.
If the triple consolidation is realized, than situation in Europe will resemble that in
the USA (i.e. large domestic market, sustaining big and competitive companies). How-
ever the American example also points to same negative effects of such developments.
It is widely noted that consolidation of defence industry in the USAhas created a virtual
oligopoly, with few large contractors securing the lion’s share of defence procurement.
Lack of competition is one of factors causing inefficiencies, cost overruns and delays in
many American defence programmes. Creating “pan-European champions” can lead to
expectations that they will receive all major orders practically “automatically” without
an open bidding process. Political pressures and lobbying could conceivably lead to
closure of European defence market for foreign firms and creation of protectionist “for-
tress Europe”.56 That would deprive governments of benefits (like effectiveness and
cost-efficiency) brought by competition and also provoke other states to reciprocally
close their markets for European products.
Market consolidation could arguably proceed even further with the creation of
trans-Atlantic defence market. United States and Western Europe have a long and
generally successful record of defence policy coordination, military cooperation and
joint defence-industrial undertakings thanks to the NATO framework. However, the
benefits of industrial cooperation to date have been rather one-sided. More often than
not, US companies benefited the most by supplying European nations with their prod-
ucts (with more or less advanced participation from European industrial partners). At
the same time US defence market has been largely closed for EU-based firms. This situ-
ation has generated much mistrust between the two sides. The case of the American
KC-X programme is emblematic in this regard. Although EADS won the competition
to supply new tanker aircraft to the USAF (going to significant lengths in order to ac-
commodate US demands, like teaming with Northrop Grumman and planning to manu-
facture aircraft at a US-based plant), political pressures lead to repetition of the tender
and award of final contract to Boeing (amid accusations of unequal treatment).57
Those negative experiences notwithstanding, it is clearly visible that US Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) is becoming more open to working with European contractors
and companies from both states learn to cooperate better. EU-based firms have worked
hard to establish footholds in the US market and in many cases they have succeeded.
Several business models have been employed to achieve this goal. BAE Systems simply
bought several American defence companies and created a US subsidiary, fully compli-
ant with stringent security requirements of the federal government. At the other hand,
EADS build its own operations in North America, opening manufacturing plants for the
needs of DoD awarded contracts. In third example, Thales established a joint-venture
with US giant Raytheon to successfully pursue undertakings in North America. Further
integration of US and European defence markets could bring additional benefits. More
industrial cooperation would make the allies’ militaries even more interoperable. De-
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fence companies from both sides of the Atlantic could find new market opportunities
for sales and mergers (possibly leading to even greater consolidation). Finally, US gov-
ernment could benefit from European firms’ expertise and increased competition in its
defence procurement process (ideally with better results with lesser costs). However,
significant obstacles for such a scenario exist. They primarily concern the political
pressures on both sides to preserve national industries.58
If efforts at the expansion of the “domestic” market fail, European defence sector
may be forced to fall into greater export dependency. As already mentioned, there are
ample opportunities on the global market to secure profitable contracts for supply of
weapons and military equipment. At least some EU-based companies have significant
advantages which could put them in good position to secure a sizeable part of such
deals. With shrinking demand on domestic markets the pressure for greater export ori-
entation will grow. This could lead to a situation in which European companies derive
most of their turnover and profits from extra-European markets. While this could sus-
tain them for some time, many risks accompany such a scenario. Similar developments
have taken place in Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. With meagre orders
from national armed forces Russian companies aggressively pursued foreign sales. It
has lead to a partial overturn of a traditional pattern in which weapon systems are devel-
oped for the domestic consumer and then exported. In Russia, in the last two decades,
the opposite was often true. New products had been developed for export customers
with little interest from domestic buyers. Such a model is hardly attractive for the host
government, which draws little military benefits from such a state of affairs.
It is important to remember that many potential customers are interested in develop-
ment of their own defence industry. Thus industrial cooperation can be an important
prerequisite for securing profitable deals. That is why European companies could nur-
ture their own future competitors. Growing trend towards industrial cooperation can
point to another avenue for European defence industry development. Defence compa-
nies could perhaps “globalise their operations”, much like many non-defence compa-
nies did. A situation can be envisaged where large part of products’ assembly (mostly,
but not exclusively for export sales) is conducted in offshore locations by industrial
partners form customer states. Thus, the relatively simple and costly part of the opera-
tion would have been outsourced, while the core of the business (mainly R&D, market-
ing for domestic needs) would remain in Europe. Prime contractors could also provide
profitable services, like training or technical maintenance. Perhaps, from a strictly busi-
ness point of view, such a model could offer benefits in terms of market access and effi-
ciency gains. However, it is far from guaranteed that it could be employed to the
defence sector. Consent of European governments could be hard to obtain. And the
question remains for how long customers/industrial partners from “emerging markets”
would be content with the role of cheap producers.
Finally, diversification of activity to new areas (such as civil production or secu-
rity equipment) could offer the defence companies opportunity to secure profits in
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times of restrained defence budgets. As mentioned earlier in this paper, many European
companies successfully draw benefits from dual-business models (civilian and mili-
tary). In new security environment after the end of the Cold War, and especially after
the 9/11 attacks, new emphasis has been put on internal/homeland security missions. It
was expected, that defence sector could find new business opportunities in the form of
supplying their products to law enforcement/crisis management services.59 However,
report prepared by a consortium led by the Istituto Affari Internazionali for the Euro-
pean Commission concludes that significant obstacles remain for defence companies to
profit from “the blurring of dividing lines between security and defence”. This situation
is a product of the security market’s fragmentation, dynamic nature and difficulties in
transferring defence expertise/solutions into this field. However, under right circum-
stances, potential for profitable forays into this market exists.60
* * *
This paper aimed to show that, due to important functions performed by the defence
industry (military, political, economic and even welfare), the direction of its future de-
velopment will be of serious significance for the EU member states and for the EU as
a whole. If the Union aims to be an important player in international political and strate-
gic relations it should posses corresponding means (adequate defence-industrial base
among them). Analysis provided in this paper shows that the EU-based defence compa-
nies posses significant competitive strengths. At the same time, the external environ-
ment is a source of significant threats in form of shrinking domestic markets and highly
competitive global business environment. However, potential opportunities can (at
least partially) balance those threats. As described above, the further development of
Europe’s defence sector can progress among many different paths. It is difficult to as-
sess the probability of their realization. It seems however, that in order to preserve and
expand its position, it will have to be open to creative changes, in form of new business
models, product categories or new ides in the realm of defence policy.
ABSTRACT
Current economic crisis in the EU can prove to be a turning point for the European de-
fence-industrial base. The purpose of this article is to analyse the current state of the
EU-based defence sector and possible trajectories of its future evolution. In order to achieve
this aim, an overview of defence industry’s functions has been provided, followed by
SWOT analysis of internal and external factors influencing the current and future position
of the European defence-industrial base. Presentation of the sector’s strengths and weak-
nesses, as well as threat and opportunities coming from the external environment provides
basis for assessment of possible future directions of industry’s evolution.
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PRZEMYS£ OBRONNY W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ – WYZWANIA I SZANSE
W CZASACH KRYZYSU EKONOMICZNEGO
STRESZCZENIE
Obecny kryzys gospodarczy w Unii Europejskiej mo¿e okazaæ siê punktem zwrotnym dla
europejskiej bazy przemys³owo-obronnej. Celem tego artyku³u jest przedstawienie analizy
obecnego stanu sektora obronnego UE oraz mo¿liwych kierunków jego dalszego rozwoju. Dla
osi¹gniêcia tego celu, przedstawiono krótka charakterystykê funkcji przemys³u obronnego a na-
stêpnie analizê SWOT wewnêtrznych i zewnêtrznych czynników wp³ywaj¹cych na obecn¹
i przysz³a pozycjê europejskiej bazy przemys³owo-obronnej. Prezentacja silnych i s³abych stron
tego sektora, jak równie¿ szans i zagro¿eñ wystêpuj¹cych w jego otoczeniu zewnêtrznym stwo-
rzy³a podstawê dla nakreœlenia mo¿liwych dalszych kierunków ewolucji tej ga³êzi przemys³u.
Defence Industry in the European Union – Challenges and opportunities... 113

